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International Trade and Foreign Investment:
A Model with Asymmetric Production
M ALl KHAN*
We present a two-country model of trade and investment in which the out-
put of one country is used as an intermediate input in the other country. Our work
extends and qualifies recent work of Kemp and Ohyama and also has a bearing on
the theory of foreign investment with sector-specific capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
Kemp and Ohyama [10] and Findlay [3] have revived interest in the study
of an asymmetrical world economy in which a group of resource-poor but capital-
rich countries trade with and invest in a corresponding group of resource-rich but
capital-poor countries. Their work relies on a two-country model but one which
fundamentally departs from standard trade theory in not assumingthat the countries
are identical in all respects except factor endowments. One of the striking results to
I come out of this line of research is that there is no limit to the extent to which the
I resource-poor country can exploit the resource-rich country by suitable instruments
of commercial policy but that "the latter can exploit the former only partially".
However, it is somewhat surprising that no one has asked how robust this and other
results are with respect to the assumption of each country being completely special-
ized. We do this here by introducing an additional sector in the resource-poor
country. This has the further advantage that by bringing labour allocation to the
fore, it allows us to examine a wider set of issues - in particular those pertaining to
the taxation of labour employed in the sector with foreign capital.
Our model can also be looked on as a variation on a recent piece of Jones and
I Dei [7] which develops the theory of trade and investment based on the Ricardo-
Viner assumption of sector-specific capital. Specifically, we examine the extent to
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which the Jones-Dei results require modification if their assumption of both count-
ries producing an identical commodity with an internationally mobile factor of pro-
duction is replaced by one in which the output of the non-specializedcountry is used
as an intermediate input in the production process of the other.
Finally, our work has a bearing on the theory of optimal policy associatedwith
the names of Jones [5] and Kemp [8]. This theory derivesformulae for the optimal
interference in the markets for capital and final products from the viewpoint of
national advantage. Our relevant results can be seen as an extension of this theory to
a set-up which allows, and therefore calls for, interference also in the market for a
purely intermediate good.
Section 2 presents the model and preliminary analysis. Section 3 is devoted to
comparative statics and discusseshow four instruments of commercial policy affect
outputs, international capital movements and factor returns. Section 4 is devoted to
questions of optimal policies from the viewpoint of national advantage. Both
Sections 3 and 4 are based on the assumption that the prices of the final goods are
exogenously given and Section 5 examines the consequence of relaxing this assump-
tion. Section 6 ends the paper with two concluding remarks.
We assume that there is international mobility of capital between Industria and the
primary resource sector in Resourcia and that both countries are endowed with
positive amounts of labour and capital, Le. (K*, L*) and (K, L) respectively. We




On the pricing side we assume competitive markets and subsume the marginal
productivity conditions into the underlying unit cost functions.4 We may thus
write
P =C (w*,R,p); p =C(w,R); P,=C,(w,q)m m r r r (2.5)
where w, w* are the respective wage rates, R the rental rate of capital, q the return
to land and p. the price of commodity i, i = m, r, f All that remains is a specifica-
I
tion of demand. We assume that both countries share identical homothetic prefer-
ence patterns and can therefore write
2. THEMODELAND PRELI~INARY ANALYSIS
Let there be three commodities, m, rand f, produced in two countries, Indus-
tria and Resourcia. Industria is specialized and produces manufactures m in accord-
ance with a well-behaved,l constant-returns-to-scale production function and using
as inputs, capital, labour and a primary resource. Wemay thus write
D (Pm/p,) =Xm t2.6)
X =F (L*K X )m m ' m' r (2.1)
Our model is now completely specified and it is worth observing that a spe-
cialized Resourcia yields the Kemp-Ohyama model and that the Jones-Dei model is
obtained if Industrian manufacturing is independent of the primary resource.
Now let us assume the existence of a unique equilibrium in which Resourcia
is not completely specialized. One way to think of this equilibrium is to let com-
modity f be the numeraire and assume nxed values of K and p. This allowsus tor r
focus on Resourcia and observe that we are in the Ricardo-Viner world of Jones,
Samuelson and NearyS for which the responses of Lr' L" Xr, X" R, q and w to Pr
and Kr are well understood. On substituting these responses into the price equals
cost equation for Industria and equations (2.3) and (2.6), we can determine the
equilibrium values of p and K. To see this, simply rewrite the equilibrium condi-r r
tion in the international capital market (2.3) as
Following Kemp and Ohyama [10], we shall also as~ume2p3 ~ 0 where subscriptsm
denote differentials with respect to the corresponding variables. Resourcia produces
the primary resource r as well as food f, both in accordance with well-behaved3
constant-return-to-scale production functions but with sector-specinc capital, say
land and capital, and with labour as the only intersectorally mobile factor of
production. Wemay thus write
X =F (L , K ); X,=F,(L,, T)r r r r (2.2) 2C (w*,R,p)X +K =Km r m r (2.7)
lWe shall assume that a "well-behaved" production function is twice continuously
differentiable in each of its arguments with strictly diminishing marginal productivities.
2This constitutes (3c) on page 95 in their paper.
3See footnote 1 above.
and that in the Industrian labour market as
4
The properties of these cost functions are by now well understood; see, for example,
Gorma~'s Tricks piece [4].
See Jones [6], Samuelson [13] and Neary [12].
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1
C (W" R P ) x =L*m "r m (2.8)
where again subscripts denote differentials with respect to the corresponding vari-I
able. Both (2.7) and (2.8) are equations in the P - K plane if the dependence ofr r
w* on Pr' Kr is obtained from (2.6) and the first equation in the system (2.5).
The above procedure brings out clearly how our model is a simple extension
of the Ricardo-Viner model to a two-country setting. However, it is ill-suited for
comparative static analysis. For this, it is much more efficient and natural to think
in terms of primal variables. In this case, we can reduce our equilibrium to the
Lr - Kr plane and the remainder of this section is devoted to this. Given competi-
tive markets, we can alternatively write equation (2.5) as
Xr
2 2
PmFm =R = PrFr (2.9)
F3 -Pm m -Pr (2.10)
0
A
Figure 1. Equilibrium in the Capital Market
Kr
1 1
P F =W=p Ff f r r (2.11)
From these, we can obtain our basic equations
F2 =F2 /F3r m m (2.12)
3 1 1
P F F =Pf F fm m r
Xr(2.13)
It is clear that on using equation (2.6) we can reduce equation (2.13) to one
involvingLr and Kr' However until Section 5, we shall assume that both Pf and Pm
are exogenously given. This allows us to understand the basic structure and proper-
ties of the model without bringing in the complications of changes in the terms of
trade. Once these basic properties are clear, it is a simpler matter to allow for such
chan~es.
Equation (2.12) states .simply that the marginal rate of substitution between
capital and the primary resource is equal in equilibrium to the marginal product of
capital in the production of the resource. Such an equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1
where the curve OA represents the production function of the primary resource
under a given value of the labour input L . The other lines in Figure 1 represent ther
isoquant map for Industrian manufactures but it is worth noting that each isoquant
implies a particular value of L and at the point E, this value is identical to the oner
which parametrizes OA. As pointed out by Ron Findlay, Figure 1 completely
characterizes the equilibrium in the Kemp-Ohyama set-up. In our context, it enables
us to determine only a locus in the Lr - Kr plane. To determine the slope of such a
0







Figure 2b. ~> Q
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locus, we have to see how the value of K corresponding to the point E responds tor
marginal changes in Lr. It is clear that such a change shifts the OA curve outward in
a manner that its slope at any given value of Kr increases. The same is true of our
isoquant map - it too shifts outward in such a way that the marginal rate of substitu-
tion at any given value of Kr increases. Such shifts are shown in Figures2a and 2b
and they can lead to an increase or a decrease in the equilibrium value of Kr. The
parameter governingthis change will playa crucial role for our model, and as the pre-
ceding discussionindicates, it is givenby
3 I I
Pm F m F r = Pr Fr
310 (F2F3 IF2 )
~= g r m m
3L r
(2.14)
All this can, of course, be established algebraically. Routine differentiation of
equation (2.12) yields
F32 F2 F33 F22 F22 F23 F2
dK [- ~ + ---2: !!! +...!:.-+..!!!.- - ~ ] + dL
r F3 F3 F2 F2 F2 rm m r m m
F21 F33 F1 F23 F1
[~+~ ~-_J] =0
F2 F3 F2r m m
(2.15)
which, in more convenient notation, can be written as
International Trade and Foreign Investment
~ Lr
G. Lf
Figure 3. Equilibriwn in the Labour Market
~
A dKr + ~dLr =0 (2.16) Kr
Equation (2.13) is the equilibrium condition for the Resourcian labour market
and it can be conveniently depicted as Figure 3. However,note that unlike Figures 1
and 2, here the curves are parametrized with respect to K. Equation (2.13) alsor
furnishes a locus in the L -- K plane and here again it is easy to see that the sloper r
of this locus may be negative or positive, i.e. a marginal increase in Kr shifts both of
the curves outward in a way that Lr may increase or decrease. What is more interest-
ing is that it is again ~that governs whether the locus has a negative or positive slope.
This is because Pr is endogenous to the system and can be easily seen on differentiat-
ing equation (2.13). Weobtain
E
F32 F33 F12 Fll Fll
dK [-/~ +~ F2 +2-]+dL [~+-.L
r F3 F3 r F1 r F1 F1m m r r f
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~dK + B dL =0, ,
Equations (2.16) and (2.18) can now be used for comparative static analysis.
They are plotted in Figures 4a and 4b where the EE locus corresponds to equation
(2.16) and the LL locus to equation (2.18). Givenour assumption that F~3 ~ 0, and
that the technologies are well behaved, it is clear that A < O. What still needs
elucidation, however, is why LL is steeper than EE. For this we need to look at
dynamic stability and some reasonable adjustment processes. Denote by P the
following adjustment process
(2.18) 3. EFFECTS OF COMMERCIALPOLICY
In this section, we consider four instruments of commercial policy, viz. an
Industrian export tax on manufactures, a Resourcian export tax on the primary
resource, profit taxes and a Resourcian tax on labour employed in the sector with
foreign capital. Weexamine how each of these instruments affects outputs and factor
prices and also their effect on Industrian and Resourcian welfare. Our analysiswill be
conducted in terms of the equations (2.16) and (2.18) and we shall leave it to the
reader, if he so wishes, to provide for himself a geometric argument based on Figures
4a and 4b.
DK = cI>(R- R ) cI>'> 0, ct>(0)= 0, , m
DL, =1I;(w,- wf) V> 0, 11;(0)= 0
(i) An Industrian Export Tax
In this section we consider an advalorem tax t levied by Industria on its
exports of manufactures. The first point to note is th&t equation (2.12), and hence
the EE schedule, remains unchanged by the imposition of such a tax. It is this that is
responsible for the strong Kemp-Ohyamaresult quoted in the introduction. However,
in our context, it is easy to check that an imposition of such a tax leads to a term dtl
(1~t) on the right hand side of equation (2.17) and hence causes the LL schedule to\
move to the left in both Figures4a and 4b.
Let us first consider the case when ~> O.Hereboth Land K fallleadingto a, ,
contraction in the output of the primary resource and an expansion of the output of
food. The change in manufactures can be easilydetermined by
ax 2 dK dL aK dL
---!!!...= F (- --q + F3 (F1 ---1:. + F2 --2:...) = F3 FI-2. < 0 .. (3.1)
at m dt m, dt ' a t m, a t
The corresponding changes in the factor prices can be easily determined from
the followingformulae.
where D is the time derivative operator and R. and w. the rental and wage ratesI I
respectively in sector i. Such an adjustment process is very much in the spirit of
Neary [11; 12] and we can easilyestablish the following result.
Proposition I: A locally unique equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable under the
adjustment process P if and only if AB - e== /J.> O.
Proof: It is well known that under local asymptotic stability, none of the eigenvalues
of the matrix obtained by linearization of P can have positive real parts. Suppose
one, and therefore both, have a zero real part and can be written as :t (3i.Then /J.
equals their product which is a positive number. The sum of the roots is zero which
implies that A+B is zero, a contradiction of the fact that A<O, B<O.Thus, suppose
that both roots are real but that one of them is zero. But this implies that /J.=0 or
that the LL and EE schedules are identical. This contradicts the fact that equilibrium
is locally unique. Thus, the only case remaining is when both roots have negative
real parts and in this case, it is a standard result that /J.> O.
The fact that /J.> 0 and B < 0 are sufficient for stability follows from a well-
known result. Q.E.D.
A final point that needs to be cleared up is whether there exist natural assump-
tions under which ~can be shown to be positive or negative. A simple example allows
us to establishthat this cannot be done. let F = cI>(L*,K )X andF =A(aL-P+m m,' ,
)
-P ) -IIP . 33 23 1 2 1(1-a K, . It ISeasy to check that F = 0, F F IF =F IF and thus~21 21m 1+ m , m "
reduces to F IF -F IF which equals paiL P (aL-P + (I-a) K-P ). It is now"" " ,
clear that the sign of ~ depends on the sign of p which may be positive or negative.
Indeed, fo~ a Cobb-Douglas world, p and, therefore, ~ are zero. In this case EE is a
horizontal line and LL a vertical one. In the sequel, we shall leave it to the reader to
see how our results apply to this degenerate case.
aR 22 dK
- = p (F (- -' )a t m m dt
aw 11 aL
- = p F (- -' ) < 0
at f f at
aw* dK ~
- =P (F12 (- -' ) + F 13-' )a t m m dt m dt
dX





-' = P (F32 (- ---1:.) + F33 -')a t m m dt m dt (3.5)
I
We now consider the implications of an export tax on Resourcian and
Industrian welfare. Let us assume that Resourcia is a borrower of foreign capital and
let Resourcian welfare be measured by a quasi-concave utility function U(.) which is
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defined on Resourcian consumption (Zm' Zt)' Let g, (Pm' P" U) be the minimum
expenditure6 at prices Pm and P, required to reach the utility level U. Wecan then
write the Resourcian income/expenditure identity as
g(Pm,p" u) =P,X, +P, X, - R(K,-K) = wL, + P, X, + RK (3.6)
On differentiating identity (3.6), we obtain 7
ou ow oR
g - =L-+K-
0 ot ' ot ot
(3.7)
Given equations (3.2) and (3.3), it is clear that we have obtained the Kemp-Ohyama
result that Resourcian welfare always decreases with an increase in an Industrian
export tax. However, what is interesting is that it is now no longer in the interest of
Industria to keep on increasing this tax. To see this, consider the analogue of
equation (3.6) for Industria, Le.
g*(p (I-t), P" u*).=P (I-t)X + R(K - K) - p X +P t (X -g*) (3.8)m m ., m , "m m 1
On differentiating equation (3.8) and collecting terms, we obtain
mt 0 u* 2 dR 0 X op
g*(1+'- )- = -p ~g*+ (K -K)- + P t-m-X --.!: (3.9)
0 I-t 0 t mil, dt mot ' 0 t
where m is the marginal propensity to consume the exported commodity. Given that
K , R and X all decrease with an Industrian export tax, we can now see that from, m
an initial position of free trade, Le. t = 0, it would never be in Industria's interest to
impose an export tax even though such a tax would be detrimental for Resourcian
welfare. Indeed, at such an initial position of laissez-faire,an export subsidy increases
both Industrian and Resourcian welfare. At any rate, an optimal value of an export
tax can be found on equating (3.9) to zero. Whether such a value is unique and is a
global optimum depends, of course, on second order-conditions which require
assumptions on the third derivativesof the underlying technologies. .
In the case when an Industrian export tax leads to an inflow 'of capital into
Resourcia, Le. ~ < 0, it is not even clear that Resourcian welfare decreases. Note that
in this case X falls in spite of increased foreign investment. It is easy to check from,
equations (2.16) and (2.18) that
oK oL
---1:\= - ~/1:::., -' = All:::.ot ot (3.10)
6It is well known (see, for example Gorman [4]) that 0 is (i) positively homogeneous
of degree 1 in prices. (ii) concave function of the prices, and (iii) Og/op, is the consumption of
the ith commodity.
7go is the differential of g with respect to u and represents the inverse of the marginal
utility of income.





0 X F2 F1,-, [ 1: + '--- -<;-::2
0 t I:::. F,
It is now clear from equation (3.2) that 0 Rio t may not necessarily fall and there-
fore from equation (3.7), g ~ may increase.
In concluding this section, it is useful to observethat an Industrian export tax




(ll) A Resourcian Export Tax
A Resourcian ad valorem export tax at the rate v results in equation (2.10)
remaining unchanged but with p (I-v) being substituted for p in equations (2.9), ,
and (2.11). Thisleadsto a termdvl(I-v) on the righthandsideof eachof equations
(2.16)and(2.18)andweobtain
oK B-~ oL, - ., -









As in Section 3(i), let us begin by considering the case ~ > O.Herethe LL
schedule shifts upwards and the EE schedule downwards so as to decrease the
equilibrium values of both L, and K, and consequent contraction of X, and Xm' X,
increases and equations (3.2) to (3.5) remain as before but with v substituted for t. If
the revenue from the export tax is distributed in a lump-sum fashion, Resourcian
welfare is implicitly defmed by
I
~
~ g(Pm' P,. u) = P,(I-v) X, +P, vX, + p,X, - R(K,-K) (3.13)
whichon differentiationyields
OU op oR
g - =X ---!... - (K - K) -
°ov 'ov ' ov (3.14)
An analogous expression for Industria is given by
ou* op 0R
g* - = - X ---!... + (K - K) -°ov 'ov ' ov (3.15)
We thus obtain the interesting result that at least for the case ~> 0, there is no limit
to the extent to which Resourcia can exploit Industria.by means of a single instru-
ment - a tax on the export of the primary resource. On viewing this result in
conjunction with that of Section 3(i), we can observe that there is indeed asymmetry
in the bargaining position of the two countries but in a direction opposite to that
asserted by Kemp-Ohyama.
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For the case ~< 0, the EE and LL schedules shift in a way that the direction of
L, and K, cannot be determined without additional assumptions on technology. The
kind of assumptions that one will need are clear from the formulae in equation
(3.12). It is, of course, possible in this case that there is an optimal value at which
Resourcia should set its export tax.
Industrian welfare, on the other hand, is now givenby
g* (p ,P f 'u*) = P X + (1-r)R(K -K) - P Xm m m " , (3.22)
and it is clear that
aK B aL ~ ~, - ., -
a r - ~ (1-r) , a:;:- - ~ (1-r) (3.16)
a u* a K dR dp
g* - = - r R ~ + (1-r)(K -K) - - X --.!: - R(K -K) (3~23)
oar ar 'ar 'ar '
we can thus conclude that from an initial position of laissez-faire,an imposition of a
Resourcian tax on foreign earnings is detrimental to Industria. If there is already
such a tax in existence, an increase in it yields a savingto Industria of the amount of
its capital earningsnot taxed away by Resourcia, i.e. rR a K,/dt.
Wecan also consider a situation in which Industria taxes the foreign earningsof
its capital in Resourcia. If the proceeds of such a tax are redistributed in a lump-
sum fashion to Industrian residents, Industrian welfare is given by
(ill) A Tax on Capital
Now let us suppose that Resourcia imposes an ad valorem tax r on the earnings
of foreign capital. It is clear that this keeps equation (2.18) unchanged but results in
a term dr/(1-r) on the right hand side of equation (2.16). Wecan therefore conclude
that
Thus a Resourcian tax on foreign capital always decreasesforeign investment.
In the case ~ > 0, L, and consequently X, and Xm both decrease. Again, equations
(3.2) to (3.5) remain unchanged but with r substituted for t. Resourcian welfare is
now given by
g*(p ,P
f ' u*) = P X + R(K - K) - P Xm m m , , ,
\
Resourcian welfare, of course, is determined by
(3.24)
g(Pm,Pf' u) = P,X, + PfXf - (I-r)R(K, -K) ... (3.17) g(Pm,Pf' u) = P,X, +PfXf -R(K,-K) (3.25)
On differentiating this with respect to r, we obtain
au aR aK
g - =R(K -K) -(1-r)(K -K)- +rR T
0 ar' r ar ar
It is now clear that in the case under consideration, i.e. ~> 0, a restriction of capital
imports from an initial position of laissez-faireis in Resourcia's interest. Indeed, the
optimal tax is given by
(3.18)
On differentiating each of these expressions, we obtain
au* ap aR
g*- = -X -..!: + (K -K) -
0 ar* , ar* , a r* (3.26)
ropt = (Kr-K) (R-aR/ar)
-(RaK /ar+(K -K)aR/ar), r (3.19)
au aR ap
g - = -(K -K)- + X -L
0 ar* , ar* 'a r*
It is clear that the allocative effects of an Industrian tax r* are identical to that.
of a Resourciantax on foreigncapital - only the tax proceedsfall in different
hands. We then obtain, in the case ~ > 0, the result that an increase in r* is always
detrimental to Industrian welfare but beneficial for Resourcia. Of course, in this
case, a subsidy to the earningsof its capital abroad would have opposite effects.
(3.27)
and isclearlya positivenumber.If welet
a log R a log K
€ = € = r
R a log r ' K a log r
(3.20)
(iv) A Tax on Labour
€R
ropt = 1+€R + €K
(3.21)
In this subsection we consider the consequencesof a tax on Resourcian labour
employed in the primary resource sector. In this case equation (2.16) remains
unchanged but we have to add a term ds/(1-s) on the right hand side of equation
(2.18), where s is the ad valorem rate of the tax. It is now clear that the LL schedule
shifts so that
we can r~rite equation (3.19) in more conventional terms as
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a Kr - - ~ aLr - A
~ - 6(1-s)' ~ - 6 (1-s)
In the case ~ > 0, an increase in a tax on labour decreases the amount of foreign
capital in Resourcia and results in a decrease of both Xr and Xm' On !lPpealing to
equations (3.2) to (3.5) with s substituted for t, we deduce that Rand w fall and
Pr rises. The change in the position of Industrian labour is ambiguous and depends on
how the marginal product of labour in Industrian manufacturing responds to changes
in capital and the primary resource.
In the case ~ < 0, an increase in the rate of tax increases the amount of foreign
capital in Resourcia. The change in Xr is givenby
a x F2 F 1
r = ~ (A---;- -n <0
as 6 (1-s ) F r
4. OPTIMALCOMMERCIALPOLICY
(3.28) So far, our concern has been with particular instruments of commercial policy.
We have examined how each of these affects outputs, the distribution of income and
welfare. We also deduced the optimal values of these instruments from the viewpoint
of national advantage. In this section we adopt a different and, in some sense, an
opposite point of view. We focus here instead on each country's welfare and ask what
instruments, and the values of these instruments, are required to maximize it. From
this angle, the optimal policies of Section 3 may be looked on as second-best8
policies since the choice of instrument has already been determined and one is trying
to accomplish with a single instrument what, as we shall see below, typically requires
two.
(3.29)
The first point to be noted is that with exogenously given prices of food and
manufacturing, Pm and Pf' the optimal policy for Industrian and Resourcian
welfare taken together is a position of laissez-faire. Of course, this is intuitively clear
since there are no distortions or a monopoly advantage to be taken care of. In any
case, this can be easily seen on examining the first-order conditions for the problem.
Resourcian wages fall but the rental may increase. A sufficient condition for such an
increase is simply that the marginal product of capital in Industrian manufacturing be
independent of the amount of the primary resource.
These results may be usefully compared with the corresponding ones of Jones
and Dei who argue that the rental always falls and that the wages always rise in the
country not imposing the tax.
Finally, we consider the effect of such a tax on welfare. In the case of
Resourcia, we obtain
\ Maximize PmF m + Pf Ff
subject to Lr + Lf = L
K +K =Kr m
a u a P dw aR
g - = X _r+ L w+Ls~ -(K-K)-
0 as r as r r ds r as
Thus, in the case ~ > 0, on starting from a position of laissez-faire,it is always in
Resourcia's interest to restrict the employment of its nationals in the sector with
foreign capital. Indeed, the optimum rate of such a tax is positive as can be seen
easily on equating a uja s to zero.
In the caseof Industria, we have
(3.30) It is clear that the necessary conditions are precisely those given in equations (2.9)
and (2.11).
The position is totally changed when we consider each country on its own.
Industrian welfare is maximized on solvingthe following problem.
au* ap aR
g* - = - X ~ + (K - K)-
0 as ras r "as
It ~ easily seen that in the case ~> 0, Industrian welfare decreaseswithout limit.
(3.32)
Maximize P F (L*,K ,M) -P M+R(K*-K )m m m r m
M,Km
If Industria is to take P and R as exogenously given, the market solution is optimalr
for it and there is little more to be done. The point, of course, is that Industria
realizesthat both Prand R dependon the amount of the primary resourceand
capital that it uses. Specifically, on the assumption of a passiveResourcia, these are
givenby
(4.1)
g*(p ,P f 'u*) = P X + R(K -K) - P Xm m m r r r (3.31)
from which we can obtain
3 2
P = P F . R = P F (L K-K )r m m ' r r r'. m (4.2)
8Indeed, as. Brecher points out in a different context, such policies are third-best if
consumption taxes are allowed.
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It is this observation that calls for interference with the laissez-faire solution. The
nature of such an interference can be easily seen on examining the necessary condi-
tions for equation (4.1), with equation (4.2) being appropriately substituted. We
obtain
As before, Resourcia has little reason to interfere with the market solution if it
considers P and R as being beyond its control. It is only under the assumption of ar
passive Industria and the fact that
3 2
Pr = PmFm (L *, K-Kr' Fr (Lr, Kr))' R = PmFm (L *, K-Kr' Fr (Lr, Kr)) (4.8)
3 33 2 33
P F - P - P MF + (K* - K )F P F =0mm r m m mrmm
2 32 22 2 32
P F - R - p MF - (K* - K ) (p F - F p F ) =0m m m m m r r r mm
(4.3) that optimal interference in the markets for capital and the resource is called for.
(4.4) On solvingequation (3.7), with equation (3.8) appropriately substituted, we obtain
On simplifying these expressions, we obtain
MF33
p ::;:p F3 [1 ---!!L




1 331 231 1
P F + p F F F + (K-K ) p F F =w =Pf F frr mrmr rmmr (4.9)
(4.5)
F2 - R + F (F33 F2 - F32) + (K-K) (F23 F2 - F22 ) =0Pr r Pm r m r m r Pm m r m (4.10)
F22 F32 MF32
R[1 + (K*-K ) (2-- ~)] = P F2 (1- -2!!... )
u F2 F3 m m F2r m m
(4.6) On simplifying these expressions, we obtain
1 F F33
W = P F (1 + .L..2!!..
r r F3m
F23
+ (K-K ) ~ )
r F3m
(4.11 )
It is now clear that optimal policy for Industria calls for an import subsidy on the
primary resource and also interference in the international capital market. If the
marginal product of capital is independent of the amount of the primary resource,
i.e. F32 = 0, such an interference takes the form of a subsidy to capital used inm
Industria, or alternatively, a tax on the earningsof capital in Resourcia. Thus, at least
in this case, the optimal policy of Industria involves encouragement to the
production of the primary resource. Such an encouragement takes the form of
furnishing a higher price for it as well as in subsidizing one of its inputs. In the case
when MF32 /F2 > 1, it is no longer clear whether capital at home should be taxedm m
or subsidized.
An alternative set of first-best commercial policies for Industria is a produc-
tion subsidy on manufacturing accompanied by a tax or subsidy on the earnings of
capital at home. It is worth pointing out that the result is consistent with the corre-
sponding result of Section 2 that an Industrian production tax is not necessarily
beneficial for Industrian welfare. It is also useful to note that, unlike Kemp-Ohyama,
no singleinstrument suffices for the maximization of Industrian welfare.
Wenow turn to Resourcia. Its optimal set of commercial policiesmay be found
on solvingthe following program.
Maximize P F + Pf X f - R(K - K)r r r (4.7)
R = F2 [1 + Fr (F33 - (F32 /F2)) + (K-Kr) (F23 - (F22/F2 ))] (4.12)
Pr r F3 m m r F3 m m rm m
It is now clear that optimal policy for Resourcia calls for the taxation of
foreign capital as well as taxation of the earnings of labour employed in the sector
with foreign capital. It is interesting that this result has affinity with a point first
made by Kemp and Negishi [9] and later generalized by Bhagwati,Ramaswamiand
Srinivasan [1]. These authors argue that tariffs could be used to improve the welfare
of a country suffering from a distortion in the labour market; in the case at hand one
arising from a wage differential. Here we find that a country may exploit its
monopoly power in trade by resorting to the first-best policy of introducing a wage
differential in the labour market.
An alternatiye set of optimal policies for Resourcia is a production tax on the
primary resourcealong with a subsidy on foreign capital.
We conclude this section by pointing out that in the Jones-Dei model F:n =0
and the optimal policy for Resourcia in that context calls for a restriction on the
international flow of capital. For Industria, the optimal policy is to subsidize the
outflow of international capital. Of course, this result, as indeed all the others in
this section, is based on the premise that Resourcia is a borrower of Industrian
capital.
subJect to Lr + Lf = L
5. ENDOGENOUSTERMSOF TRADE
Our analysis has benefited so far from the simplifying assumption of
exogenously given prices of food and manufactures. Such an assumption allowed us
526 M. Ali Khan International Trade and Foreign Investment 527
P, = I/> (X,) 1/>' ( . ) < 0 ... (5.1)
emerging from our model carryover. It is worth stating that this sensitivity to the
choice of the numeraire is the direct consequence of the asymmetric production
structure of our model.
It is when we turn to questions of optimal commercial policy that relaxation of
the assumption of exogenously given terms of trade becomes most interesting. It is
at this stage that we make contact with the standard theory of optimal commercial
policy as developedby Jones [5] and Kemp [8].
Let the Industrian consumption of manufactures and food be denoted by
(C:',C;> and that of Resourcia by (Cm,C,). The first-best policy for Industria is
obtained on maximizing U*(C:' ,C;) subject to
to focus on international capital movements and the market for the intermediate
input without bringing in the complications arising out of changes in the terms of
trade of the final products. While it is clear that even with such an assumption our
model has relevance for many problems, exogenously given prices have no place in a
North-South model. Fortunately, the analysis remains tractable even with
endogenous terms of trade.
Let manufactures by the numeraire commodity and the inverse demand
function for food be givenby
Since only one of our basic equations, (2.13), involves the price of food, equation
(2.16) and the corresponding EE schedule remain unchanged. In the context of the
LL schedule, equation (2.18) is modified so that B is substituted by B' where
C* = F - Cm m m (5.4)
C* = R(K*-K ) - p M + p C, u r m m (5.5)
B' = B - (1/>'F; /1/» (5.2) with K , M and p as the relevant control variables. On letting q (=U* fU,':>beu m. m m
the price ratio faced by Industrian consumers, it is easy to derive the following
necessary conditions.
C -F F3 (1-(K*-K )F2fF)




Thus, in the context of the comparative statics exercises presented in Section 3,
our earlier assumption that B be negative has to be strengthened to the requirement
that B be negative. However, this follows from the stability result of Section 2 where
the dynamic process p now takes account of the fact that P, is endogenous. With
these modifications, the allocative effects of the various instruments of commercial
policy remain unchanged, as do the results on Industrian welfare. However, the
results on Resourcian welfare require a routine modification involving the elasticity
of the world demand for food. For example, in the context of an Industrian export
tax, differentiation of equation (3.6) yields
F22 F32 2 a I





aw , ax aR
=L -+E I/> ---1+K-
rat' at at
(5.3)
3 33 2 aI
P = qF - Mp F (1 - (K* - K ) F fF) - (q-p ) C I - (5.8)r m m m u r r m m aM
Cmp denotes the change in the Resourcian demand for manufacturing corresponding
to the change in the price of manufacturing. In the absence of any inferiority in
consumption C < O. C I is the change in the demand corresponding to a changemp m
in the Resourcian income and is assumed positive. It is important to be clear as to
how the change in Resourcian incomes are brought about. Note that Industria is
exploiting the fact that p and R respond to changes in K , M. Since Resourcian. r u
mcome I is givenby
where E, is the food exports to Industria. Thus, in the case ~> 0, the term-of-trade
effect merely strengthens our earlier result that an increase in an Industrian export
tax decreasesResourcian welfare.
Of course, the question arises as to what happens if food rather than manufac-
turing is the numeraire commodity. In this case, our results concerning Industrian
welfare require modification in the light of changes in the terms of trade. However,
more importantly, in the context of equation (2.18), both ~and B require modifi-
cations. This results in the coefficient of dKr in equation (2.18) being different from
that of dLr in equation (2.16) and prevents a stability result as clean as in the
Proposition of Section 2. This also results in the various casesbecoming interchanged
in the context of our comparative statics results. Nevertheless, the basic insights
I = P F + F, - R (K* - K )r r u (5.9)
it is easy to check that both a I /a M and a I/a Ku are positive.
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We now get on to the optimal poJicy formulae themselves. They can most
usefully be compared with the corresponding equations (4.5) and (4.6) which are
modified in the set-up of this section to allow for the exploitation of Industria's
monopoly power in the market for manufactures. However, it is to be noted that
unlike the first-best discussion of Jones and Kemp, Le. with F3 = 0, it is no longerm
clear that the price faced by Industrian consumers is lessthan the world price.9
The first-best policy for Resourcia is obtained on maximizing U(Cm,C,)
subject to
C = p X - R(K -K) + P C*m r r r " (5.10)
C, = X,- C*, (5.11)
with Kr' Lr and P, as the relevant control variables. On letting q, (= U, /Um) be








- (K -K) -2!!-) = qF1 + (q - P )C* - (5.13)
r F3 , "1* aLm r
32 22
2 F 33 F 23F
P F (1 + 2- (F -~) - (K-K)(F - 2!!. )) =
r r F m F2 r m F2m r r
aI*
R + (q-p ,) C'!r* a Kr
(5.14)
where Industrian income 1* is given by
I*=F + R(K*-K ) - pMm u r (5.15)
and obviously responds positively to changesin Lr and Kr'
In the case of Resourcia, the optimal policy in the market for food isjust as in
the traditional theory of trade and investment and, in the absence of inferiority in
consumption, calls for Resourcian consumers to face a lower than international
pricelO. Equations (5.13) and (5.14) are the corresponding modifications of
equations (4.11) and (4.12).
"
9See, for example, Section 3 in Brecher [2].
lOIndeed equation (5.12) is identical with equation (6) in Brecher [2].
International Trade and Foreign Investment 529
6. CONCLUDINGREMARKS
We have presented a model of trade and investment which is well suited for
answering a variety of questions of both a positive and normative nature. It is,
however, worth underscoring that our results rely crucially on the stability result
reported in Section 2. To put the point somewhat differently, we could have
obtained a variety of results, including paradoxes, based on a variety of assumptions
if a stability result did not ensure the positivity of 6. The importance of stability of
equilibrium in narrowing down the range of possible results has, of course, been
re-emphasizedrecently by Neary [II; 12] .
We have not considered the effects of technical progress concerning which
Kemp and Ohyama conclude.that it reduces international indebtedness irrespective
of the country in which it occurs. We leave it to the reader to check for himself
that this result too is not robust with respect to the addition of an additional sector
in Resourcia. We also leave it to the reader to derive for himself the effects of factor
accumulation and changes in the terms of trade in the case when the prices are
exogenously given. There do not seem to be any surprises here beyond what we
have discussedin Section 3.
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